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INTRODUCTION
In a much-cited Harvard Law Review article twenty-three
years ago, Judge Pierre N. Leval criticized the state of fair use
doctrine as lacking “a set of governing principles or values.”1
Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of
fair use. Earlier decisions provide little basis for
predicting later ones. Reversals and divided courts
are commonplace. The opinions reflect widely
differing notions of the meaning of fair use.
Decisions are not governed by consistent principles,
but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to
individual fact patterns.2
Judge Leval introduced “transformativeness,” a concept not
explicitly mentioned in the Copyright Act, as a way to assess the
first statutory fair use factor—“the purpose and character of the
use.”3 Rather than examine, as the statute suggests, whether the
use “is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
1
2
3

Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1990).
Id. at 1106–07.
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).

2014]

CARIOU V. PRINCE AND FAIR USE JURISPRUDENCE

323

purposes,” courts should assess, as the test was later adopted by the
Supreme Court, “whether and to what extent the new [allegedly
infringing] work is ‘transformative’” of the copied work.4 To be
transformative, “[t]he use must be productive and must employ the
quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from
the original.” If the new work does not “merely ‘supersede the
objects’ of the original,” but instead “adds value to the original—if
the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.”5
Transformative use has, by steady accretion, come to dominate
fair use case law, but has failed to provide the hoped-for consistent
governing principles. It has, to the contrary, led courts to highly
idiosyncratic results. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
way the Second Circuit— considered the leading copyright court—
has handled the fair use issues of appropriation art.
Cariou v. Prince,6 the third appropriation art case decided by an
appellate court (all in the Second Circuit), was eagerly anticipated by
the art world for its potential impact on the future of appropriation
art and the rights of photographers, and by copyright practitioners
interested in the direction of the fair use doctrine. It should
disappoint all those constituencies, though for different reasons.
The plaintiff photographer lost as a matter of law on twenty-five of
the thirty artworks.7 The decision to remand five works of art was
consistent with Prince’s appellate argument for considering each
work separately rather than the collection as a whole,8 but it may
still cause considerable chagrin to the champions of appropriation
art who argue that context alone transforms and therefore all thirty
works were equally transformative and fair use.

4

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
Leval, supra note 1, at 1111.
6
714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013). The opinion was
published a little more than eleven months after it was argued.
7
Id. at 707.
8
Id. at 710–11.
5
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Of greatest concern to those who practice or follow copyright
law is the extent to which transformativeness has become virtually
a one-factor test by over-powering factors that would otherwise
weigh against fair use, the extent to which that concept has become
a euphemism for aesthetic and other value judgments that judges
claim to eschew, and the failure of the appellate decision to explain
why some works were more transformative than others. Cariou v.
Prince confirms what academics have long noted and practitioners
recognized: that the ascendancy of transformative use analysis has
coincided with and become a justification for a judicial tilt toward
fair use, but has failed to bring greater clarity and predictability to
fair use decisions and has instead become an empty buzz-word.
This Article will briefly summarize the ascendancy of
transformativeness to provide a context for a review of the three
appropriation art cases—two against Jeff Koons and one against
Richard Prince. It will show the diverse and even inconsistent
legal analyses the courts have used, that transformativeness is
inadequate to explain the results, and, ultimately, that, as leading
copyright academics have noted, transformativeness has decayed
into a conclusory label that substitutes for, rather than enhances,
thoughtful analysis.9 As such, it does not make prediction of legal
outcomes any easier than the statutorily based multi-factor
balancing test it is supposed to be a part of, but has in practice
often dominated or replaced. I ultimately conclude that if
transformative use is to retain any utility in the overall fair use
analysis, it must return to a more modest role as part of the first
fair use factor to be weighed in more traditional fashion with or
against, without effectively swamping, the other factors.
Given the correlation—and likely causal relation—between the
rise of transformativeness and an increase in favorable fair use
determinations, returning to a more traditional fair use multi-factor
balancing test would likely tilt decisions in a pro-copyright-owner
direction. It would most likely not, however, be a sharp tilt

9

See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1]
[b] (2012).
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because of the trend favoring fair use in public and judicial
attitudes.
Furthermore, the impact of that doctrinal shift would not be as
large as it might have been in the past because it would be
mitigated by the demise of the automatic remedy of injunctions in
copyright infringement that was started by the Supreme Court
seven years ago in the eBay case,10 which the Second Circuit
flagged in its remand of five of the works at issue in Cariou v.
Without routine injunctions against copyright
Prince.11
infringements, a judgment that something is not a fair use will not
necessarily or likely mean that the secondary work will be
suppressed, but will instead mean that the appropriator (intended as
a neutral term, not a moral judgment) will have to pay for the
reasonable value of what has been taken.12
I. HOW TRANSFORMATIVENESS BECAME
THE HEART AND SOUL OF FAIR USE
Fair use in copyright began as a common law concept whose
basic precepts were not codified into statute until the Copyright
Act of 1976.13 It has since been considered primarily, if not
exclusively, a matter of statute.14 Section 107 of the Copyright Act
10

eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712 n.5.
12
This may have been what the Second Circuit was implicitly encouraging by clearing
twenty-five works and remanding five in Cariou v. Prince. See infra text accompanying
notes 241–42 and 280–81.
13
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). For a succinct summary of the process and of Professor
Nimmer’s attempt to “include only a spare recognition of the fair use defense” rather than
the four-factor test that ultimately prevailed, see Richard Dannay, Factorless Fair Use?
Was Melville Nimmer Right?, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 127, 128–32 (2013).
14
There is a First Amendment basis for fair use because it is a matter of protecting
freedom of expression. The courts have held, however, that the statutory fair use test,
together with other copyright doctrines, is adequate to protect First Amendment rights.
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (The “traditional contours of
copyright protection,” that is, the “idea/expression dichotomy” and the “fair use” defense,
moreover, serve as “built-in First Amendment accommodations.” (citing Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556, 560 (1985))); Roy Export Co. v.
CBS, Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1982) (“No circuit that has considered the
question . . . has ever held that the First Amendment provides a privilege in the copyright
11
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of 1976 requires a court to consider four factors in determining
whether use of a copyrighted work is fair and therefore not
infringement:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.15
The first factor initially turned, as the statute would indicate, on
whether a use was for a commercial or nonprofit purpose. In a
1984 case on home video recording of television programs (the
“Sony” case), the Supreme Court reasoned that “every commercial
use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation
of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright.”16
Ten years later when dealing with a parody song recorded for
profit in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,17 the Court
effectively discarded that presumption in the guise of limiting Sony
to its facts.18 It held that no such presumption could have been
intended in the statute because “nearly all of the illustrative uses
listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107, including news

field distinct from the accommodation embodied in the ‘fair use’ doctrine.”). Professor
Netanel notes and criticizes this view. See Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright Within
the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (“[C]ourts have almost never
imposed First Amendment limitations on copyright, and most have summarily rejected
copyright infringement free speech defenses. In almost every instance, courts have
assumed that First Amendment values are fully and adequately protected by limitations
on copyright owner rights within copyright doctrine itself.”).
15
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
16
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
17
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
18
Id. at 584–85, 591.
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reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and
research . . . ‘are generally conducted for profit.’”19
The Court explained that Sony’s statement that commercial use
was “presumptively” unfair had been meant to apply to that case’s
specific context of wholesale duplication.20
Sony involved
potential vicarious liability of distributors of video tape recorders
to “time-shift”—to record complete television shows and other
material exhibited on television to view at some other time.21 As
we will see, however, Campbell’s holding relevant to the specific
issue of parody—the freedom to use large amounts of the original
work that parody requires—was soon expanded beyond that
limited context to all transformative uses.22
There was even a time when the fourth factor was considered
preeminent. In Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises,23 the
Supreme Court pronounced the fourth factor “undoubtedly the
single most important element of fair use. ‘Fair use, when
properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not
materially impair the marketability of the work which is
copied.’”24 That too was rejected by, or reinterpreted in light of,
the ascendency of transformative use. Campbell held that a parody
could destroy the marketability of its target, just as a bad review
19
Id. at 584 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
592 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)); see NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471,
477–78 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584). The statement is a bit of an
exaggeration, since most people would not consider “comment, criticism, teaching, [and]
scholarship” to be activities conducted for profit. The distinction between doing
something for which one is compensated (for example, scholarship and teaching) and
doing it for profit may be subtle but nevertheless not difficult to understand. It may be
true that, as the Court quoted from Samuel Johnson, “‘[n]o man but a blockhead ever
wrote, except for money.’” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (quoting 3 JAMES BOSWELL, THE
LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, 19 (G. Hill ed., 1934)). It is probably also true, however, that
only a blockhead would be motivated to become a writer or scholar by the thought of
being well compensated for it.
20
Id. at 591 (“[W]hat Sony said simply makes common sense: when a commercial use
amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of an original, it clearly ‘supersede[s] the
objects.’” (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841))).
21
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984).
22
See discussion infra Part VI.B.
23
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
24
Id. at 566–67 (1985) (quoting 1 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 1.10[D]).
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could attempt to do so, because “there is no [protectable]
derivative market for criticism.”25
Two years before Campbell, Judge Leval’s law review article
argued for a different way to look at the first factor: whether the
accused work was “transformative.”26 Considering “‘the purpose
and character of the use’ raises the question of justification. Does
the use fulfill the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity
for public illumination?”27 “[T]he answer to the question of
justification,” he argued, “turns primarily on whether, and to what
extent, the challenged use is transformative. The use must be
productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different
manner or for a different purpose from the original.”28
The article and the Supreme Court’s approval of its advocacy
of the transformativeness concept in analyzing parody several
years later sent the law down a path different from the Supreme
Court’s prior emphasis on commercial use as presumptively
unfair.29 Although both the article and the case link the concept,
without directly attributing it, to Folsom v. Marsh,30 an early
American copyright opinion authored by Joseph Story (as Circuit
Justice), neither the word “transformative” nor, I would argue, the
concept, is used in that opinion.31
25

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994).
Leval, supra note 1, at 1111.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583–85, 590–92.
30
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
31
In arguing “[t]he irrelevance of the morality of the secondary user’s conduct” to fair
use, Judge Leval invokes the authority of Folsom v. Marsh: “There Justice Story
emphasized not only the good faith and ‘meritorious labors’ of the defendants, but also
the usefulness of their work. Finding no ‘bona fide abridgement’ (what I have described
as a transformative use), Justice Story nonetheless concluded with ‘regret’ that good faith
could not save the secondary work from being ‘deemed in law a piracy.’” Leval, supra
note 1, at 1127. I would not equate usefulness with transformativeness. In Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court contrasted a transformative use with one that, “in Justice
Story’s words, . . . merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation.” Campbell,
510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348). There, Justice Story was discussing
what ultimately became the fourth fair use factor and contrasting a summary or
commentary on a work with producing a substitute for reading the work. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 107(4) (2012).
26
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More importantly, several limitations that Judge Leval would
have put on the power of transformativeness were lost in
subsequent doctrinal development. Though he called the first
factor “the soul of fair use,” Judge Leval considered it a necessary
but not sufficient condition for finding fair use: “A finding of
justification under this factor seems indispensable to a fair use
defense.”32 Two years later in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the
Supreme Court agreed with the first part of Judge Leval’s
statement by holding that “transformative works . . . lie at the heart
of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the
confines of copyright.”33 Contrary to Judge Leval’s second
statement, however, it held that transformativeness was not
necessary to a fair use determination while hinting that it might be
sufficient.34
Although later decisions gave this factor power to diminish or
completely override the significance of the other factors, Judge
Leval did not believe that transformativeness led inexorably to a
fair use determination: “The existence of any identifiable
transformative objective does not, however, guarantee success in
claiming fair use. The transformative justification must overcome
factors favoring the copyright owner.”35 Alluding to the third
factor, he added that “the secondary user’s claim under the first
factor is weakened to the extent that her takings exceed the
asserted justification. The justification will likely be outweighed if
the takings are excessive and other factors favor the copyright
owner.”36
The emphasis on transformativeness has certainly engendered
creativity on the part of copyright lawyers, if not on the part of
artists. Arguments that any given use is transformative have
increasingly become strained, and the concept has come in some
cases to simplistically overpower the other fair use factors rather
than engage with them.
32
33
34
35
36

Leval, supra note 1, at 1116.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
See id. (emphasis added).
Leval, supra note 1, at 1111 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1112.
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As will be shown in Part II below, the concept of
transformative use came to dominate the way in which
appropriation art was judged—a doctrinal trend criticized by
academics and treatise writers, as noted in Part III below, and the
subject of snarky remarks by practitioners. The increase in
doctrinal power has corresponded with an increase in fair use
determinations but also a decrease in explanatory power and
coherence.
II. PRIOR APPROPRIATION ART CASES
A. Rogers v. Koons
Rogers v. Koons, decided in 1992, involved a sculptural
adaptation of a folksy photograph of a couple holding their eight
new German shepherd puppies.37 Among its copyrightable
elements were that Rogers “selected the light, the location, the
bench on which the [human couple] are seated and the arrangement
of the small dogs. He also made creative judgments concerning
technical matters with his camera and the use of natural light.”38
Koons bought a postcard of that photograph, tore the copyright
notice off—considered to show bad faith—and sent it to a studio
with instructions to his artisans to copy it faithfully in a sculpture
of polychromed wood, albeit with specified colors and (apparently
though not mentioned in the opinion) some daisies strategically
added.39 The Rogers photo and a photo of the Koons sculpture are
shown on the next page:

37
38
39

960 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.
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As a transformation from photo to sculpture, the Koons work
would obviously be an infringing derivative work if not considered
fair use. The court noted that Koons “works in an art tradition
dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century . . . [that] . . .
defines its efforts as follows: when the artist finishes his work, the
meaning of the original object has been extracted and an entirely
new meaning set in its place.”40 This would now be interpreted as
a defense of the work’s transformative use of the prior material,
albeit in a conceptual sense without necessarily any physical
change.
The changed context alone is transformative.
Transformativeness was not, however, mentioned in the opinion.
The Court of Appeals’ discussion of the first fair use factor
focused solely on, and Koons was sharply criticized for, his
commercial purpose and artistic arrogance in copying the photo as
closely as possible:
The copying was so deliberate as to suggest that
defendants resolved so long as they were significant
players in the art business, and the copies they
produced bettered the price of the copied work by a
thousand to one, their piracy of a less well-known
artist’s work would escape being sullied by an
accusation of plagiarism.41
40

Id. at 304.
Id. at 303. The district and appellate courts expressed outrage at Koons’
disobedience of the lower court’s order to turn over his fourth and last copy of String of
Puppies by spiriting it out of the country to a museum in Germany. Id. at 306, 313. Since

41
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The opinion acknowledged that “String of Puppies” was “a
satirical critique of our materialistic society,” but said “it is
difficult to discern any parody of the photograph ‘Puppies’
itself.”42 That is a peculiar holding in at least three respects:
(1) The opinion at that point correctly distinguished parody
from satire in the manner later done by the Supreme Court’s
Campbell decision: parody comments on the specific work used,
while satire uses “another’s copyrighted work to make a statement
on some aspect of society at large.”43 At other points, however,
the opinion completely muddies that distinction and uses the two
concepts interchangeably: “Parody or satire, as we understand it, is
when one artist, for comic effect or social commentary, closely
imitates the style of another artist and in so doing creates a new art
work that makes ridiculous the style and expression of the
original.”44
(2) Having noted that the cases hold that “parody and satire are
valued forms of criticism, encouraged because this sort of criticism
itself fosters the creativity protected by the copyright law,” the
court then again confused the two concepts and seemingly held
that only parody is entitled to fair use protection. For the copied
work to be the object of the parody or ridicule, the copyist must
conjure it up, which requires and “entitles its creator under the fair
use doctrine to more extensive use of the copied work than is
ordinarily allowed.”45
that would have been preparatory to its potential destruction, getting the work out of the
country was a desperate attempt to save the remaining unsold copy. Impoundment and
destruction of an infringement is explicitly authorized in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §
503, and a remedy that did not appear unusual in Rogers v. Koons. An indication of how
times change is that this common remedy for common infringements seemed sufficiently
shocking to the appellate court in Cariou v. Prince, at least as applied to artwork, that
plaintiff’s counsel decided at oral argument not to defend the district court’s adoption of
that remedy. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d at 704 n.4.
42
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
43
Id. “Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to
use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can
stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994).
44
Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309–310.
45
Id. at 310.

2014]

CARIOU V. PRINCE AND FAIR USE JURISPRUDENCE

333

It is the rule in this Circuit that though the satire
[actually parody] need not be only of the copied
work and may, as appellants urge of “String of
Puppies,” also be a parody [actually satire] of
modern society, the copied work must be, at least in
part, an object of the parody, otherwise there would
be no need to conjure up the original work.46
The problem is that the distinction is one of degree rather than
dichotomy. Commenting on and ridiculing the prior work (that is,
parody) requires greater use, conjuring more, of the prior work.
Satire, however, also has to conjure an original work even without
commenting on it. Satirical songs, for example, use a well-known
melody with different, preferably funny but sometimes merely
crude words. Satire needs to conjure less of the original, but still
needs to conjure some of it.47
(3) In considering the appropriation to be satire rather than
parody, and therefore lacking justification for the copying, the
Second Circuit panel was too dismissive of the extent to which
Koons commented on Rogers’ specific photo and too ready to
restrict his justification for using it to his “acting within an artistic
tradition of commenting upon the commonplace.”48 “String of
Puppies” did seem, from the objective perspective later adopted by
Cariou v. Prince, to comment on and ridicule Rogers’ work. The
mere fact that the sculpture was part of something called the
“Banality Show” says that the earnest folksiness of Rogers’ photo
Moreover, the changes in the
was an object of derision.49
depiction of the humans in the sculpture—primarily the facial
expressions and teeth—make them look far more like hicks than
does the photograph.
The court noted that the copied work need not be the exclusive
focus of comment or ridicule—it need only be “at least in part” the
object.50 Under that standard, Koons’ work should have been
46
47
48
49
50

Id.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81.
Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
See id. at 304.
Id. (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981)).
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considered both parody and satire, which, under subsequent
doctrinal development, would deserve some respect and ability to
copy Rogers’ work under the first fair use factor.
Notwithstanding its confusion at some points of the difference
between parody and satire, Rogers v. Koons ultimately showed
great insight in teasing out why parody is justified in using more of
the original than is satire. It noted that the function of the rule that
the prior work be “at least in part” an object of the parody
is to insure that credit is given where credit is due.
By requiring that the copied work be an object of
the parody, we merely insist that the audience be
aware that underlying the parody there is an original
and separate expression, attributable to a different
artist. This awareness may come from the fact that
the copied work is publicly known or because its
existence is in some manner acknowledged by the
parodist in connection with the parody.51
That is, the parodied work must be well known for the parody to
succeed.
What perhaps kept “String of Puppies” from being parody as
the court conceived that concept is not that it did not ridicule
Rogers’ photograph but that the object of its ridicule was neither
acknowledged nor well enough known to be recognized.52 This
subtlety seems to have gotten lost in future cases.
Koons was sued on two other works in his Banality Show, and
lost both cases in district court opinions that followed the Second
Circuit’s opinion in the Rogers case.53
B. Blanch v. Koons
51

Id.
Id. (“By requiring that the copied work be an object of the parody, we merely insist
that the audience be aware that underlying the parody there is an original and separate
expression, attributable to a different artist. This awareness may come from the fact that
the copied work is publicly known or because its existence is in some manner
acknowledged by the parodist in connection with the parody.”).
53
See Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055 (RO), 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1,
1993); United Feature Syndicate v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
52
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Sixteen years later, Koons was again sued for using a
photographer’s work in one of a group of seven paintings called
“Easyfun-Ethereal.”54 The appropriated photograph below on the
left was a fashion photo by Andrea Blanch entitled “Silk Sandals
by Gucci” that had appeared in Allure magazine.55 It shows a
woman’s feet in a man’s lap in the first class section of an airplane
and was intended to have an erotic content.56 The painting on the
right below, called “Niagara,” “depicts four pairs of women’s feet
and lower legs dangling prominently over images of confections—
a large chocolate fudge brownie topped with ice cream, a tray of
donuts, and a tray of apple danish pastries—with a grassy field and
Niagara Falls in the background.”57

Having learned the lesson from the prior case, his lawyers
drafted an affidavit for Koons explaining the need to copy the
extracted portion of Blanch’s fashion photo the way he did, rather
than to construct his own photograph of women’s feet in sandals.58
The court quoted approvingly his stated justification for using the
specific Blanch photo:
54
55
56
57
58

Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 247–48.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 255.
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Although the legs in the Allure Magazine
photograph [“Silk Sandals”] might seem prosaic, I
considered them to be necessary for inclusion in my
painting rather than legs I might have photographed
myself. The ubiquity of the photograph is central to
my message. The photograph is typical of a certain
style of mass communication. Images almost
identical to them can be found in almost any glossy
magazine, as well as in other media. To me, the
legs depicted in the Allure photograph are a fact in
the world, something that everyone experiences
constantly; they are not anyone’s legs in particular.
By using a fragment of the Allure photograph in my
painting, I thus comment upon the culture and
attitudes promoted and embodied in Allure
Magazine. By using an existing image, I also
ensure a certain authenticity or veracity that
enhances my commentary—it is the difference
between quoting and paraphrasing—and ensure that
the viewer will understand what I am referring to.59
To compare the appropriation of a photograph to quoting or
paraphrasing in a written work is odd, because doing either in a
written work would require citation. In stating that “images almost
identical to” Blanch’s photo are ubiquitous, a point “central to [his]
message,” and that the photograph was “a fact in the world,”
Koons was attacking the creativity of the photograph which, was at
least an attempt to lessen its protection against fair use under the
second factor, and could be construed as challenging any copyright
protection at all.60 More importantly, his assertion of the
importance of the fact that at least one of the photos was a real
fashion magazine photo assumes without explanation that his
audience would recognize those particular feet and shoes as
coming from a fashion magazine. Recognition or citation, which

59
60

Id.
Id.
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should be the essence of parody as per Rogers v. Koons, was again
missing.61
Undoubtedly with the assistance of legal ghost-writing, Koons’
affidavit invoked the talismanic language of transformative use: “I
transformed the meaning of these legs (as they appeared in the
photograph) into the overall message and meaning of my painting.
I thus suggest how commercial images like these intersect in our
consumer culture and simultaneously promote appetites, like sex,
and confine other desires, like playfulness.”62
The case shows the remarkable extent to which the
transformative use concept superseded the commercial/nonprofit
dichotomy in determining which side the first factor favors. The
district court opinion devoted almost 900 words of its
consideration of the first factor to whether Koons’ use of the
Blanch photograph was transformative.63 Its entire consideration
of the commercial versus non-profit distinction was to state that
“[b]oth works were created for commercial purposes” before the
non sequitur: “The first factor favors defendants.”64
The Court of Appeals’ decision was not so unbalanced, but its
discussion of the first factor immediately delved into whether
Koons’ use of Blanch’s photograph was transformative, which,
echoing Campbell, it termed the “heart of the fair use inquiry.”65 It
concluded after lengthy discussion that it was indeed
transformative because Koons used “Blanch’s image as fodder for
his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass
media.”66 In other words, it was satire rather than parody.67
That Koons’ use was commercial was cursorily acknowledged
to be relevant, though “secondary” to transformativeness and
ultimately insignificant.68 It balanced Koons’ and his gallery’s
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp. 2d 476, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 480–81.
Id. at 481.
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 254–55.
Id. at 254.
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economic gains not against other fair use factors but against a
perceived public interest in the exhibition of art.69 The most telling
sentence is this: “Notwithstanding the fact that artists are
sometimes paid and museums sometimes earn money, the public
exhibition of art is widely and we think properly considered to
‘have value that benefits the broader public interest.’”70
What explains the difference in results of the two Koons cases?
Each of the two Koons cases dealt with only one work of art, so
each decision was binary. The second case was a victory for
Koons, and much of the theory of appropriation art was accepted in
relation to the work at issue, but it was not what such artists and
their defenders would have hoped for, which is an acceptance that
when an artist appropriates an element of common culture, that
very act transforms it into a new work sufficient by itself to be fair
use even if little other than context is physically changed.
The most likely explanations for the difference between the
two decisions are that:
(1) Koons and appropriation art in general had become more
established in the art world and seemed less outrageous in the
sixteen years between the two opinions.
(2) Blanch v. Koons was written by a Manhattan-based former
first amendment lawyer (Judge Sacks) rather than the more
personally conservative, upstate Judge Cardamone, who wrote
Rogers v. Koons.
(3) There was a vast quantitative difference in the extent of the
photograph that was used and the extent of its use in Koons’
artwork. In other words, the second case could have been decided
primarily by a relatively standard application of the third statutory
fair use factor.
(4) In the sixteen-year interval between the two cases, the
Supreme Court in Campbell had downgraded the significance of
commercial use in the first factor analysis in favor of an emphasis
69

Id.
Id. (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir.
1994)).
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on transformative use championed in Judge Leval’s law review
article.71
(5) Correlated with (4) and potentially causally related, a
substantial judicial tilt toward finding fair use.72
All likely played a role, with the last three of greatest
importance from the perspective of the doctrinal development of
fair use extended in Cariou v. Prince.
III. CARIOU V. PRINCE
A. Facts
Patrick Cariou spent six years living among Rastafarians in
Jamaica developing a trusting relationship that “allowed him to
take a series of portraits and landscape photographs” that were
published in 2000 in a book called “Yes Rasta.”73 He described
the photographs as “extreme classical photography and
portraiture,” with a respectful attitude toward his subjects.74 As
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted, “the book
enjoyed limited commercial success.”75 The publisher printed
7,000 copies and sold 5,791 of them.76
Four of those sales were to well-known appropriation artist,
Richard Prince.77 His work “has involved taking photographs and
other images that others have produced and incorporating them
into paintings and collages that he then presents, in a different
context, as his own.”78 Prince tore photographs from “Yes Rasta,”

71

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 17–34.
See, e.g., discussion of Professor Netanel’s study infra text accompanying notes
149–67.
73
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698–99 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618
(2013).
74
Id. at 699.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
72
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altered them “significantly,” and made thirty works of art in a
collage called “Canal Zone.”79
The district court dealt with all thirty works as a whole,80
though, as the appellate court noted, “[t]he portions of Yes Rasta
photographs used, and the amount of each artwork that they
constitute, vary significantly from piece to piece.”81 In some,
“Cariou’s work is almost entirely obscured,” showing little more
than the Rastafarian’s hair.82 In others, “Prince did little more than
paint blue lozenges over the subject’s eyes and mouth, and paste a
picture of a guitar over the subject’s body.”83
Cariou sued Prince for direct copyright infringement and the
art gallery that sold his works and the publisher of the Canal Zone
book for vicarious or contributory infringement.84 The two sides
cross-moved for summary judgment, and Judge Batts of the
Southern District of New York ruled for the plaintiff.85 The
district judge “imposed a requirement that to qualify for a fair use
defense, a secondary use must ‘comment on, relate to the historical
context of, or critically refer back to the original works.’”86 Since
Prince testified that he “do[es]n’t really have a message,” that he
was not “trying to create anything with a new meaning or a new
message,” and that he “do[es]n’t have any . . . interest in [Cariou’s]
original intent,” the district court held that Prince’s “Canal Zone”
was not transformative.87 That conclusion, plus the facts that
Prince made commercial use of a large portion of Cariou’s
creative photography that harmed Cariou’s ability to get a gallery

79

Id.
Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 346, 349–53, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
81
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699–700.
82
Id. at 700.
83
Id. at 701. One of the most helpful aspects of the opinion and one essential to future
discussion of its determinations is that the Court of Appeals posted high-quality images of
all 30 works in an Appendix available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/11–1197apx.htm.
84
Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 26–37, Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (No. 108CV11327), 2009 WL 956547.
85
Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 342–43.
86
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706 (quoting Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 348).
87
Id. at 707.
80
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to show his work, led to the conclusion that all thirty works of
“Canal Zone” were not fair use.88
B. The Appellate Decision
The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in making
the definition of parody or satire—that the new work comment on
the copied work or at least on popular culture—a requirement of
transformative use:
The law imposes no requirement that a work
comment on the original or its author in order to be
considered transformative, and a secondary work
may constitute a fair use even if it serves some
purpose other than those identified in the preamble
to the . . . [statutory section on fair use—i.e.,
(criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, and research)].89
Perhaps hedging his bet on whether commentary was required,
while staying consistent with the tenets of appropriation art by
disavowing any specific intent in the works, Prince’s counsel
explained on appeal the development process of the “Canal Zone”
works as having:
[e]volved in part from a creative screenplay that
Prince began writing in 2007 entitled Eden Rock,
which is a fantastical account of survivors of a
nuclear holocaust who create their own postapocalyptic society in the Caribbean. Prince stated
in an interview, “The rastas and the lesbians started
starring in these pictures and were kind of like
bands—there are, like, five people to a picture, and
88

Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 351–54.
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706. Judge Batts noted that transformative use was not required
for a use to be fair but stated that “all of the precedent this Court can identify” that dealt
with use of “raw ingredients” to create a new work, as in appropriation art, “imposes a
requirement that the new work in some way comment on, relate to the historical context of,
or critically refer back to the original works.” Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 348. Her opinion
acknowledged “some minimal transformative element intended in Prince’s use” but held
that that factor weighed against fair use because it was “minimal at best” and varies
inconsistently from work to work. Id. at 350.
89
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every picture has a title to it. It sort of becomes an
allegory.”
By adding guitars depicting the
Rastafarian’s as reggae musicians, Prince wanted to
convey music as “the surviving, if not redeeming,
fact of life in the post-apocalyptic world.”90
Elsewhere, perhaps more candidly but still trying to fashion the
explanation for using Cariou’s photographs that Prince himself
declined to provide, the defendants’ appellate brief stated without
reference to a “post-apocalyptic world” that:
Prince desecrates Cariou’s reverential portraits by
defacing them, cutting them up, and splicing them
together with erotic nudes, electric guitars and other
detritus of our tawdry pop culture. The noble
Rastafarian who occupied a pure, natural world,
removed from contemporary culture is now
debased, plunged into the degraded and
commercialized space of sex, drugs and popular
music that American culture stereotypically
associates with Rastafarians.91
The commingling in most of “Canal Zone” of photographs of
naked women with Rastafarians in varying stages of alteration was
not explained in any greater detail.92
The appellate opinion was not concerned by that. It held that
what matters is not whether the artist tries “to explain and defend
his use as transformative” or even cares about the issue, but instead
“how the artworks may ‘reasonably be perceived.’”93 Based on its
90

Joint Brief and Special Appendix for Defendants-Appellants at 30, Cariou v. Prince,
784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11-1197), 2011 WL 5325288.
91
Id. at 5.
92
See id.
93
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707 (citing Brownmark Films, L.L.C. v. Comedy Partners, 682
F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 2012), which held that a South Park episode could be held to be a
protectable parody of an internet video on a motion to dismiss purely by the court’s
comparison of the two videos). The dissent claimed that Brownmark was an extreme
case where parody was obvious and where, due to the odd procedural posture of “a
motion to dismiss based on a non-pleaded fair use affirmative defense converted into a
motion for summary judgment on appeal.” Cariou, 714 F.3d at 713 (Wallace, J.,
dissenting).
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own examination as a “reasonable observer,” the appellate opinion
held that all but five of Prince’s works were not just
transformative, but sufficiently so to override the significance of
factors that might otherwise have weighed against fair use.94 Two
of the three judges on the appellate panel, at least, found the
following objectively determined transformation:
These twenty-five of Prince’s artworks manifest an
entirely different aesthetic from Cariou’s
photographs.
Where Cariou’s serene and
deliberately composed portraits and landscape
photographs depict the natural beauty of
Rastafarians and their surrounding environs,
Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the other hand,
are hectic and provocative. Cariou’s black-andwhite photographs were printed in a 9 1/2” x 12”
book. Prince has created collages on canvas that
incorporate color, feature distorted human and other
forms and settings, and measure between ten and
nearly a hundred times the size of the photographs.
Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, color
palette, and media are fundamentally different and
new compared to the photographs, as is the
expressive nature of Prince’s work.95
The opinion engaged in the requisite balancing of the four
statutory factors, but its conclusion that the uses were
transformative enough in twenty-five of the works inexorably led
to the determination that all factors favoring the plaintiff did not
matter as much and to the ultimate conclusion of fair use.96 The
essentially commercial nature of Prince’s artwork was dismissed as
of little significance “due to the transformative nature of the
work.”97 So too was the fact “that Cariou’s work is creative and
published.”98 The district court’s determination “that Prince’s
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 707.
Id. at 706.
See id. at 708–11.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 710.
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‘taking was substantially greater than necessary’” was rejected as
mistaken.99 The court cited parody cases for the principle that
“[t]he secondary use ‘must be [permitted] to “conjure up” at least
enough of the original’ to fulfill its transformative purpose,”100 and
then held that the large extent of copying actually “weighs heavily
in Prince’s favor.”101
The fourth fair use factor—the effect of the use on the potential
market for the original work—received more than the perfunctory
analysis given factors two and three. The district court had
credited an art dealer who considered but then decided “against
putting on a Yes Rasta show because it had already been done at
Gagosian” gallery due to her mistaken belief that “Cariou had
collaborated with Prince on the Gagosian show.”102 The district
court’s analysis was held to have misunderstood the nature of the
inquiry, which “‘is not whether the secondary use suppresses or
even destroys the market for the original work or its potential
derivatives, but whether the secondary use usurps the market of the
original work.’”103
The fourth factor was held to favor Prince because “Prince’s
work appeals to an entirely different sort of collector than
Cariou’s.”104 There was “nothing in the record to suggest that
Cariou would ever develop or license secondary uses of his work
in the vein of Prince’s artworks” or “that Prince’s artworks had any
impact on the marketing of the photographs.”105 The Court of
Appeals’ decision on that factor was marred by a certain whiff of
snobbery when elaborating on the different “sort of collector” for
Prince’s work:
99

Id.
Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994), which
involved a parody of Roy Orbison’s Oh Pretty Woman song; and citing Leibovitz v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998), which involved a parody of
a Vanity Fair magazine cover photo of pregnant Demi Moore).
101
Id. at 710.
102
Id. at 709.
103
Id. at 708 (emphasis in original) (quoting Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258 (2d
Cir. 2006), and citing NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 481–82 (2d Cir. 2004)).
104
Id. at 709.
105
Id.
100
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Certain of the Canal Zone artworks have sold for
two million or more dollars. The invitation list for a
dinner that Gagosian hosted in conjunction with the
opening of the Canal Zone show included a number of
the wealthy and famous such as the musicians Jay-Z
and Beyonce Knowles, artists Damien Hirst and Jeff
Koons, professional football player Tom Brady, model
Gisele Bundchen, Vanity Fair editor Graydon Carter,
Vogue editor Anna Wintour, authors Jonathan Franzen
and Candace Bushnell, and actors Robert DeNiro,
Angelina Jolie, and Brad Pitt . . . . Cariou on the other
hand has not actively marketed his work or sold work
for significant sums, and nothing in the record
suggests that anyone will not now purchase Cariou’s
work, or derivative non-transformative works
(whether Cariou’s own or licensed by him) as a result
of the market space that Prince’s work has taken up.
This fair use factor therefore weighs in Prince’s
favor.106
The passage above puts in stark relief just how far the Second
Circuit has come from its first Koons opinion that berated the
artistic arrogance of believing that creating expensive works for
well-heeled buyers gave the artist a free pass to copy:
The copying was so deliberate as to suggest that
defendants resolved so long as they were significant
players in the art business, and the copies they
produced bettered the price of the copied work by a
thousand to one, their piracy of a less well-known
artist’s work would escape being sullied by an
accusation of plagiarism.107
Judge Wallace, sitting by designation from the Ninth Circuit,
dissented.108 Although he agreed with most of the majority’s legal
analysis and, specifically, that the fair use defense did not require
106
107
108

Id.
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1992).
See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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the allegedly infringing work to comment on the original works, he
would have remanded all thirty of Prince’s paintings to the district
court to apply the correct legal standard upon further factual
development.109
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s disregard of
Prince’s testimony as to his intent (or lack thereof) in using
Cariou’s work.110 Noting that he is “not an art critic or expert,”
Judge Wallace “fail[ed] to see how the majority in its appellate
role can ‘confidently’ draw a distinction between the twenty-five
works that it has identified as constituting fair use and the five
works that do not readily lend themselves to a fair use
determination.”111
C. Implications for the Transformative Use Test
The opinion’s division of the Prince artworks into twenty-five
that were fair use as a matter of law and five that were not and
were therefore remanded will probably not make either side
entirely happy.112 Champions of appropriation art did not get the
complete victory that their theory of art would dictate because five
works they would consider transformative by context were
remanded for further analysis, but the fair use analysis will not
give the plaintiff much cause for optimism on the works remaining
to be decided under the correct legal standard.113
Most
importantly, however, as the dissent complained, the opinion does
not provide much future guidance for distinguishing among the
works that were at issue or in deciding future cases.114 The
109

Id. at 712–13.
Id. at 713.
111
Id.
112
See id. at 712 (majority opinion).
113
See id.
114
Id. at 713 (Wallace, J., dissenting). The split decision clearing all but five works
may have been a subtle attempt by the appellate court to encourage settlement and tilt
that settlement toward a fairly low amount of compensation by remanding only five
works. The case did indeed settle almost a year after the appellate decision. However
laudable the encouragement of settlement may be, it is problematic, to say the least, to
attempt that in an appellate opinion whose language and reasoning will set the law—at
least in the Second Circuit but also beyond—and thereby influence future unrelated
cases.
110
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distinctions at the extremes—where little is recognizable of
Cariou’s photographs or where little was changed—may be
understandable, but it may be difficult to differentiate among the
many works in the middle where much was changed but much also
remains intact.115
Consider, for example, two of the works at issue: one entitled
“Tales of Brave Ulysses,” which was determined to be fair use as a
matter of law, and another called Graduation, which was
remanded for determination. “Tales of Brave Ulysses” (on the left
below) intersperses the same unaltered Cariou photograph of a
Rastafarian four times between naked women. “Graduation” (on
the right below) uses the same photograph, with Prince having
done “little more than paint blue lozenges over the subject’s eyes
and mouth, and paste a picture of a guitar over the subject’s
body.”116

Or compare “Back to the Garden” on the left below, which held to
be a sufficiently transformative fair use as a matter of law, with
“Charlie Company” on the right, which was remanded for further
factual development.117

115
116
117

See id. at 699–704, 706–08, 710–11 (majority opinion).
Id. at 701.
See id. at 702.
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Why are the works on the left a more transformative use of
Cariou’s photographs than those on the right? When the five
remanded are compared to the twenty-five held to be fair use, what
seems to differentiate them is not the degree of transformativeness
as the court defined it,118 but instead an almost quantitative
comparison of the third fair use factor—“the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole”119—with what has been added.120 That is, it is a
matter of looking at the proportion of the copyrighted work that
was appropriated and the percentage of the secondary work that the
appropriated works comprises.121 The same amount or more of
Cariou’s photography is used in the two works to the left above as
is in the works on the right above, but his photography comprises
118
119
120
121

Id. at 706–08.
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710.
See id. at 710–11.
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and a far greater proportion of the works on the right.122 That
fairly quantitative approach explains more than does the
conceptual discussion of transformativeness and would make fair
use law marginally more predictable, but it is not a test that the
Second Circuit, at least, was willing to acknowledge.
IV. THE TRANSFORMATIVE USE TEST
IN RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CASES
It is interesting at this point to look at how transformative
use has spilled into another intellectual property area, the right of
publicity, which generally prevents the commercial appropriation
of an individual’s name or likeness.123 As we will see, however,
its adoption in the analysis of right of publicity has been
accompanied by different, potentially significant limitations.
Interpreting New Jersey’s right of publicity, the Third Circuit
recently endorsed what it referred to as the “Transformative Use
Test,”124 borrowed from copyright law by way of the California
Supreme Court,125 as a way “to balance the interest protected by
the right of publicity against those interests preserved by the First
Amendment.”126
In Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., the plaintiff Ryan Hart was a
Rutgers football star who sued over use of his likeness and
biographical information in Electronic Arts’ NCAA Football series
of video games.127 The Third Circuit used the Transformative Use
122

See id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(C) (1977).
124
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153 (3d Cir. 2013).
125
Comedy III Prods. Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808, 811 (Cal. 2001)
(holding that the sale of t-shirts and prints bearing a charcoal drawing of the Three
Stooges violated their rights of publicity because there was no discernible
“transformative or creative contribution” and “the marketability and economic value of
[the work] derive[s] primarily from the fame of the celebrit[ies] depicted”). In Winter v.
DC Comics, the California Supreme Court rejected a right of publicity case brought by
the rock musicians Johnny and Edgar Winter against use of their likeness in two
“villainous half-worm, half-human” creatures in a comic book because the drawings, to
the extent they resembled the brothers, were “distorted for purposes of lampoon, parody,
or caricature.” Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003).
126
Hart, 717 F.3d at 163.
127
Id. at 145–47.
123
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Test to conclude that the built-in ability of the game user to make
“minor alterations” to an avatar of the football player’s “unaltered
likeness” that “is central to the core of the game experience” was
not sufficiently transformative for First Amendment protection of
artistic expression to prevail over the right of publicity.128
In a significant departure from the appropriation art copyright
cases, the many creative things added to the game did not change
the analysis: “while we recognize the creative energies necessary
for crafting the various elements of NCAA Football that are not
tied directly to reality, we hold that they have no legal
significance.”129 “To hold otherwise” would mean that “[a]cts of
blatant misappropriation would count for nothing so long as the
larger work, on balance, contained highly creative elements in
great abundance.”130
Limiting transformative use to a transformation of the prior
work itself and not counting what is added—as in the Third Circuit
right of publicity case—has the potential to limit fair use. If that
analysis had been used in Cariou v. Prince, then many of Prince’s
“Canal Zone” works—certainly more than the five remanded—
would not only not have been remanded but would have been held
not transformative as a matter of law. As with Hart v. Elec. Arts,
Inc.,131 Prince added much to the photos of Rastafarians, but in
many works held to be fair use, he did not change the photos of the
subjects,132 and in many more he did little more than add lozenges
to their eyes and mouths and put guitars in their hands.133 Where
that is all he did, then the artwork would not be a protected
Transformative Use under the test applied by the Third Circuit.
Another major point of differentiation of right of publicity
from copyright cases is that courts have not imported other factors
from copyright’s fair use analysis and therefore do not balance
128

Id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
130
Id.
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Id.
132
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707–08, 710–11 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 618 (2013).
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Id. at 701.
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transformativeness against specific factors; they instead directly
balance a celebrity’s right to commercialize his or her identity
against a defendant’s First Amendment right to artistic
expression.134 Given the way in which transformativeness has
come to dominate fair use analysis in Copyright law and to render
the other factors insignificant, the outcomes in right of publicity
and in copyright cases might not be noticeably different or more
predictable, but the right of publicity analysis of Hart at least
provides greater conceptual clarity and frankness by dispensing
with what has become mostly a charade in the copyright cases of
considering other factors.
V. THE ASCENDANCY OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS
AND THE TILT TOWARDS FAIR USE
As previously noted, the concept of transformative use began
as a way to analyze the first statutory fair use factor: “the purpose
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”135
The presumptive unfairness of commercial uses had a short life in
the Supreme Court, and a more nuanced concept than commercial
versus nonprofit was needed.136 The transformative use inquiry
was intended to satisfy that need by asking the question thought to
134

See Hart, 717 F.3d at 159 (“After briefly considering whether to import the ‘fair
use’ analysis from copyright, the Comedy III court decided that only the first fair use
factor, ‘the purpose and character of the use,’ was appropriate.” (quoting Comedy III
Prods. Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001))); id. at 163 (“the
Transformative Use Test maintains a singular focus on whether the work sufficiently
transforms the celebrity’s identity or likeness”).
135
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
136
See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 571–72 (2008) (citing the Campbell Court’s rejection
of the presumption raised in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 449 (1984) that “[e]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively
unfair” while it explicitly demoted commerciality as one issue among others that a court
may consider in its analysis of the “purpose and character” of a defendant’s use.”
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583–84 (1994)). To illustrate the
point, in the first appropriation art case to come to the Second Circuit involving Jeff
Koons two years before Campbell, the word “transformative” does not appear. See
generally Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (1992).
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go to the heart of the constitutional objective of Copyright law “to
promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts”137: “whether the new
work” does not “merely ‘supersede[s] the objects of the original
creation’ . . . [but] instead adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message.”138
Commentators have uniformly noted the increasing influence
of the transformativeness inquiry on fair use analysis, but with
somewhat different views on the extent of its dominance or worth.
It would be fair to say, however, that there is a growing recognition
among academics and practitioners that transformativeness is
being used for more than it can handle.
A. The Academic Analysis
Several academics have engaged in extensive readings of every
fair use case they could find in a given period and published their
conclusions. The pioneer is Professor Beebe, who read all of the
over-300 published federal opinions from 1978 to 2005 that made
substantial use of the statutory four-factor fair use test.139 He
concluded from it “that much of our conventional wisdom about
our fair use case law . . . is wrong.”140 That “conventional
wisdom,” he said, comes from the “anecdotal method”: “one
essentially of connoisseurship . . . from a limited aristocracy of
hand-picked opinions.”141
Professor Beebe’s conclusions about transformativeness from
large-scale reading—as opposed to reviewing a small selection of
influential opinions that he calls connoisseurship—were somewhat
ambivalent. On the one hand, he concluded “that courts and
commentators
have
exaggerated
the
influence
of
transformativeness doctrine on our fair use case law” because (a)
137

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
Id. at 569 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).
139
See Beebe, supra note 136, at 554.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 553. This article could, of course, be characterized as using the
“connoisseurship” method but it is used, I would argue, for precisely the purpose it suits,
which is to critically analyze doctrinal development.
138
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“41.2% of the district court opinions following Campbell failed
even to the refer to the doctrine . . . ;” and (b) although only 18.6%
of appellate cases “failed to invoke the concept,” citation of the
doctrine began a downward trend in the early 1990s.142
Notwithstanding those reasons, there was another, more
important reason to believe that the influence of transformativeness
had not been exaggerated and to recognize its dominance.
Professor Beebe found that “in those opinions in which
transformativeness did play a role, it exerted nearly dispositive
force not simply on the outcome of factor one143 [“the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes”]144 but on the
overall outcome of the fair use test.”145
Professor Sag took a slightly different approach.146 He
examined over 280 fair use cases decided in district court opinions
from 1978 through May 31, 2011, by comparing the outcomes with
a coding of the facts.147 His analysis “reinforce[d] the dominance
of transformative use over other factors” in determining case
outcomes.148
Professor Netanel began chronologically where Professor
Beebe left off and looked at 79 opinions from 68 fair use cases
from 1996 through 2010.149 He came to a number of interesting
conclusions.
First, “the transformative use paradigm, as adopted in
Campbell, overwhelmingly drives fair use analysis in the courts
today.”150 Decisions since 2005 “that unequivocally characterize
the defendant’s use as transformative almost universally find fair
142

Id. at 604–05.
Id. at 605.
144
17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
145
Beebe, supra note 136, at 605.
146
See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012).
147
Id. at 52–53.
148
Id. at 84.
149
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
715, 731 (2011).
150
Id. at 734.
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use.”151 The dominance is a relatively recent phenomenon, though
the trend is not.152 Adoption of the transformativeness analysis
“increased measurably during the period 2006-2010, even if it was
already quite high previous to that period.153 “[Eighty-five
percent] of district court opinions and 93.75%, or all but one, of
appellate opinions” considered whether the challenged use was
transformative.154 Consistent with Professor Beebe’s prior study,
“decisions that unequivocally characterize the defendant’s use as
transformative almost universally find fair use.”155
Equally important, a finding of transformativeness shifts the
analysis of the other factors so as to render them insignificant.156
There was, for example, “a sharp decline in the weight that courts
say they are giving to whether a use is commercial.”157
Transformativeness does not overwhelm factors three and four so
much as it reinterprets them toward inevitably favoring fair use.158
The factor three issue “becomes a question not of whether the
defendant took what is the most valuable part of the plaintiff’s
work,” which would be the traditional way of evaluating the factor,
“but rather whether the defendant used more than what was
reasonable in light of the expressive purpose driving the
transformative use.”159 As seen in Cariou v. Prince, that almost
inevitably shifts the balance to fair use because it allows the
potential infringer to define how much is reasonable to take.160
It also radically reinterprets the market analysis that drives
factor four. It is no longer “whether the use falls within a
conceivable licensing market for the copyright owner.”161 It
instead “effectively delimits the legally relevant market for the
151

Id. at 740.
Id. at 734.
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Id. at 736.
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Id. at 740.
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Id. at 742.
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Id.
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Id. at 743–46.
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Id. at 745.
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See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708–11 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
618 (2013).
161
Netanel, supra note 149, at 745.
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fourth factor. If a use is unequivocally transformative, then, by
definition, it causes no market harm since the copyright holder
does not have a right to exclude others from the market for
transformative uses.”162
Professor Netanel found “a remarkable shift in favor of finding
fair use in such cases at the district court level since 1995.”163 The
success rate of defendants claiming fair use went from 22.73%
between 1995 and 2000, to 40.91% between 2001 and 2005, to
58.33% between 2006 and 2010.164 In other words, there was a
close correlation between the ascendancy of the transformativeness
analysis and decisions favoring fair use.165 The trend toward fair
use and the close correlation of that trend with the ascendancy of
tranformativeness can be seen in another quantitative observation:
a “sharp increase” over the time period from 1995 to 2010 in the
percentages of cases where judges considered transformativeness,
where they found such a use, where defendants won upon such a
finding, and in overall wins by defendants.166 Where there was
also a causal connection could not be determined empirically but,
as argued below, it is very likely.167
Lastly, Professor Reese looked at all forty-one published
appellate fair use opinions from the Campbell decision through
2007.168 He noted that the transformation that mattered in fair use
was in the purpose of the use rather than alterations to the content
itself.169 This, of course, renders the third factor powerless to
counteract the conclusion of transformativeness.
B. Criticism in the Treatises
The Goldstein treatise notes that “[i]n the years since it was
first announced [in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose] the transformative use
162

Id. at 744 (emphasis added).
Id. at 752.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id. at 754–55.
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See id. at 751.
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See R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31
COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 101, 105 (2008).
169
See id. at 119.
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doctrine has come to dominate fair use jurisprudence. Not
coincidentally—but not necessarily, either—the doctrine’s sweep
has markedly tilted decision in favor of defendants.”170 Professor
Goldstein is critical of the doctrine’s tilt toward fair use as
“ha[ving] little support in principle, and still less in precedent.” As
to the former, he notes that it “threatens to undermine the balance
that Congress struck in section 106(2)’s derivative rights provision
to give copyright owners exclusive control over transformative
works to the extent that these works borrow copyrightable
expression from the copyrighted work.”171
Noting the dominance of transformative use analysis, the
Nimmer treatise came to the bluntly critical conclusion that many
applications of the concept are conclusory—they appear to label a
use “not transformative” as a shorthand for “not fair,” and
correlatively “transformative” for “fair.” Such a strategy empties
the term of meaning—for the “transformative” moniker to guide,
rather than follow, the fair use analysis, it must amount to more
than a conclusory label. One should perform the transformative
inquiry on its own merits, bearing in mind that just because a given
use qualifies as “transformative” does not even mean that
defendants prevail under the first factor, much less that they
prevail altogether on the fair use defense.172
The next section will explore these two principal doctrinal
criticisms at greater length.
VI. THE DOCTRINAL FAILURES OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS
A. The Dubious Distinction Between an Infringing
Derivative Work and a Transformative Fair Use
If creating a transformative work is considered socially and
legally good, there is an inevitable conflict with the Copyright
Act’s definition of an infringing derivative work as “a work based
170

2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHTS § 12.2.2 at 12:33 (3d ed. 2012
Supp.).
171
Id. at 12:34.1–12:35.
172
4 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13.05[A][1][b].
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upon one or more preexisting works” that includes any “form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”173
“Transformative” is the adjective form of the verb “transform,” for
which the first two (most used) definitions are “1. To change in
form, appearance, or structure; metamorphose. 2. To change in
condition, nature, or character; convert.”174
Therein lies the problem the Goldstein treatise recognized: If
transformative use is a positive element of factor one weighing in
favor of fair use, it will sweep into fair use what Congress deemed
infringing derivative works.
An amicus brief from the American Society of Media
Photographers in Cariou v. Prince made that point.175 It argued
that the only way to reconcile the problem of the related definitions
173

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added).
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2420 (2 ed. 1997). Cf.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2427 (1986):
1a: to change completely or essentially in composition or structure:
METAMORPOHOSE;
ALTER
b:
to
change
the
outward
form
or
appearance
of:
c:
to change in character or condition: convert
The Oxford American Dictionary defines transform as “make a thorough or dramatic
change in the form, appearance, or character of.” Transform Definition, OXFORD
AMERICAN DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_
english/transform (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). If so, then it is somewhat tautological to
speak of degrees or extent of transformativeness, since any transformation is “thorough
or dramatic.” Trademark and statutory interpretation cases are two examples of disputes
that often involve arguments over the meaning of words and the extent to which
dictionaries are definitive. They inevitably delve into theories of language and
lexicography and debates over whether words have core meanings or, to paraphrase
Humpty Dumpty, mean what people mean when they use the words. Adam Liptak of
The New York Times has provided a useful commentary on the ongoing debate
concerning the Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries, juxtaposing legendary justices who
did not rely on dictionaries with today’s justices, whose collection of over 120
dictionaries seem to suggest “cherry picking.” See Adam Liptak, Justices Turning More
Frequently to Dictionary, and Not Just for Big Words, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/us/14bar.html?r=0. I prefer to avoid that debate and
simply to make the point that the difference between the verb transform and the adjective
transformative is, if such exists, one created by copyright lawyers, not by general usage.
175
Brief of Amici Curiae American Society of Media Photographers, Inc. and Picture
Archive Council of America, Inc. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee and Affirmance,
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-1197-cv), 2012 WL 435238 at
*11–12. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
174

358

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:321

of “transforms” and “transformative” is for courts to interpret the
latter in light of, and therefore arguably restricted by, the preamble
examples of fair use in § 107; “guidance as to what sort of
purposes will suffice to differentiate between a fair use and an
infringing derivative work,” the brief argued, “may be found in the
list of illustrative examples set forth in [s]ection 107, which
includes “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”176
All have in common a “necessary and deliberate relation back to,
and dependence on, pre-existing copyrightable works.”177
That was a plausible way to justify the district court’s holding
that the second work must comment on the first to be a
transformative use, and not just parody, while prudently paying the
necessary obeisance to transformative use analysis.178 But it was
rejected by the Second Circuit.179 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has already held that the preamble uses are just examples and not
meant to limit fair use.180 Some other way to differentiate a
derivative work from a fair use must therefore be found.
As seen in the discussion above, what the Second Circuit
seemed to mean by transformativeness in Blanch v. Koons and
Cariou v. Prince was not so much that the prior work was
changed—Blanch’s photograph and most of Cariou’s photographs
were redacted, albeit to greatly varying extents—as that something
else was added: some new artistic or other expressive use
protected by the First Amendment.181
Elsewhere,
the
Second
Circuit
has
interpreted
transformativeness in terms of the purpose of the allegedly
infringing work rather than on transformation of the work itself.182
In Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing, which held that
176

Id.
Id. at *12.
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Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 347–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 668–69 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618
(2013).
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Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985).
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See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708; Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006).
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See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
1998).
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a trivia book on Seinfeld episodes was not fair use, the court noted
the “potential source of confusion in our copyright jurisprudence
over the use of the term ‘transformative’”183 that Professor
Goldstein criticized184 and purported to resolve that confusion by
emphasizing the purpose of the use rather than the content. To that
extent, Cariou v. Prince could be seen as reintroducing the
confusion, because there was no discernible difference (and
certainly none explained) between the works remanded and those
cleared as fair use.
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc. applied transformativeness differently
in the context of right of publicity.185 It imposed a crucial and very
useful limit on what could be called transformative that has been
absent in the appropriation art cases and can return the concept to a
more modest and appropriate role as an element of balancing
factors: The original work itself had to be artistically changed;
adding artistic elements around it was not transformative.186 Thus,
Electronic Arts could not justify taking Ryan Hart’s identity by
making him one discreet part of a complex, creative video game.187
To give “legal significance” to the surrounding creative elements
would mean that “[a]cts of blatant misappropriation would count
for nothing so long as the larger work, on balance, contained
highly creative elements in great abundance.”188 That limitation
would have led to a very different result in the Second Circuit’s
last two appropriation art cases.
What also sabotages the attempt to differentiate “transforms” in
the derivative work sense from a transformative fair use is that
there can be much creativity in types of works that have long been
considered and will presumably remain characterized as derivative
works.189 Creative transformation therefore cannot be what makes
use of a prior work legally fair.190
183

Id. at 143.
See supra text accompanying notes 170–71.
185
See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 159–69 (3d Cir. 2013).
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See id. at 168–70.
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See id. at 169.
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Id.
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The Supreme Court has noted that “the fair use doctrine was predicated on the
author’s implied consent to ‘reasonable and customary’ use when he released his work
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Translation of a literary work is a prime example of use of a
work that requires great creativity and is highly transformative, yet
is squarely derivative.191 Literary translation is, at its best, a
retelling of a story in a different language that requires a rare
combination of skill and creativity to communicate meanings not
only across languages but also across cultures.192 It does not
supplant the market for the original because all but a few of those
who buy and read translations are unable or unwilling to read the
works in their original language.
More importantly, translations employ highly creative and
idiosyncratic uses of language.
A glimpse at the radical
differences in language, interpretation, and meaning that different
translations convey can be seen in comparative reviews of works
major enough to have more than one translation. A recent article
on two recent translations of Dante’s Inferno, adding to the
hundreds already done, can serve as an example.193 It compares
the translations of an early scene when the pilgrim first realizes
that Virgil is his guide.194 One translates the Italian into “Are you
Virgil? Are you the spring, the well, / The fountain and the river in
full flow / Of eloquence that sings like a seashell / Remembering
the sea and the rainbow?”195 The review notes: “I love ‘[that]

for public consumption.” See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 550 (1985). What is “reasonable and customary” can, of course, change over time.
190
See Hart, 717 F.3d at 168–70.
191
See 4 NIMMER, supra note 9, §13.05[A][1][b]; see also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (creating abstracts of Japanese
business articles and then translating them into English is “not in the least
‘transformative’”). Indeed, translation is listed in the Copyright Act as an example of a
derivative work. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
192
Gabriel Garcia Marquez is said to have praised Gregory Rabassa’s English translation
of One Hundred Years of Solitude as better than the Spanish original and to have said that
“Rabassa read ‘One Hundred Years of Solitude,’ sat down and then rewrote it in English.”
Andrew Bast, A Translator’s Long Journey, Page by Page, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/25/books/a-translator-s-long-journey-page-by-page.html.
193
See Joan Acocella, What the Hell: Dante in Translation and in Dan Brown’s New
Novel, NEW YORKER (May 27, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/
2013/05/27/130527crbo_books_acocella.
194
Id.
195
Id.

2014]

CARIOU V. PRINCE AND FAIR USE JURISPRUDENCE

361

seashell,’ and ‘the rainbow,’” but “[n]either is in Dante.” The
translator was “a poet, doing a poet’s work.”196
As this demonstrates, neither the degree of originality nor
creativity—nor, more precisely, a judge’s assessment of such
things—distinguishes transformed derivative works from
transformative fair uses.
B. The License Granted Parody to Override the Other Statutory
Fair Use Factors Should Not Apply to the Broader Concept of
Transformativeness
As the Nimmer treatise recognizes, the emphasis on
transformativeness has skewed the fair use analysis by dominating
the first factor and making the others almost disappear.197 It does
not, using Professor Beebe’s phrase, “stampede” the other
factors—making other factors align with it.198 It simply renders
them insignificant to the outcome.199 In doing so, it has
appropriated the privileged status of parody within fair use
jurisprudence without its justifications.
The virtual demise of the second factor—whether the
targeted work is primarily creative or factual—is an object lesson.
In the seminal parody case, Campbell, the Supreme Court held that
the fact that the copied work is creative “is not much help in this
case, or ever likely to help much in separating the fair use sheep
from the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies almost
invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.”200 Parody
comprises a small subset of transformative uses with very special
needs. It generally needs to use creative works to succeed at all.
One can certainly make fun of facts, as shown by the popularity of
the Daily Show, but it is difficult to parody them.
Also, as the Supreme Court noted, parody generally needs to
conjure up more of the original (implicating the third fair use
196
197
198
199
200

Id.
4 NIMMER, supra note 9, §13.05[A][1][b].
See Beebe, supra note 136, at 588–93.
See id.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (emphasis added).
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factor) than other uses might because it must ensure that the
original is fully recognizable:
Parody’s humor, or in any event its comment,
necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its
object through distorted imitation. Its art lies in the
tension between a known original and its parodic
twin. When parody takes aim at a particular
original work, the parody must be able to “conjure
up” at least enough of that original to make the
object of its critical wit recognizable . . . . What
makes for this recognition is quotation of the
original’s most distinctive or memorable features,
which the parodist can be sure the audience will
know.201
Finally, parody has a unique entitlement not merely to harm,
but destroy, the market for the original (neutering the fourth fair
use factor) by holding it up to ridicule:
[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater
review, kills demand for the original, it does not
produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright
Act. Because “parody may quite legitimately aim at
garroting the original, destroying it commercially as
well as artistically,” . . . the role of the courts is to
distinguish between “[b]iting criticism [that merely]
suppresses demand [and] copyright infringement[,
which] usurps it.”202
That the parodied work would almost inevitably be
“publicly known” would tend to make the potentially “lethal
parody” at least the result of a fair fight.203 A lethal
transformative use of a relatively unknown work, on the other
hand, should engender the legal equivalent of the schoolyard
201

Id. at 588 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The italicized language
shows that, as seen in Rogers v. Koons, you cannot effectively parody a relatively
unknown work. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
202
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92 (quoting B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT 69 (1967); and Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d, 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986)).
203
See id. at 587, 591.

2014]

CARIOU V. PRINCE AND FAIR USE JURISPRUDENCE

363

phrase used to shame bullies: “Pick on someone your own
size.”
In sum, parody uniquely needs to be able to override the
other fair use factors to assure its existence at all. It also has to
victimize a well-known popular work to have the desired
“Pretty Woman” is an appropriate object of
impact.204
parody;205 “String of Puppies” is not.206 Putting a sculptural
transformation of it in the “Banality Show” may be a critical
commentary on schmaltzy culture and may be protectable as
such, but it should require greater justification than parody.
Parody is one subset of transformative use, however, and its
imperatives do not necessarily apply to all transformative use.
The Supreme Court has not expanded this characteristic of
parody to all transformative uses, but the Second Circuit has,
and that has led to the displacement of the statutory balancing
in a broad swath of fair use cases.207 Moreover, the Second
Circuit has done so without explicitly acknowledging or
justifying the extension.208
In Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., the
Second Circuit noted that “the creative nature of artistic images
typically weighs in favor of the copyright holder,” but
“recognized . . . that the second factor may be of limited usefulness
where the creative work of art is being used for a transformative
purpose.”209 Its support for that was a quote from Campbell that
was specific to parody that the Second Circuit expanded to
transformative use in general. It characterized Campbell as
holding “that the second factor is not ‘likely to help much in
separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats’ in cases
involving transformative copying of ‘publicly known, expressive

204
See, e.g., id. at 588 (indicating that the “parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least
enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable”).
205
See id. at 594.
206
See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
207
See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 208–19 and accompanying text.
208
See supra note 207.
209
448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 2006).
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works.’”210 As shown above, however, the Supreme Court did not
say or imply that this was true generally “in cases involving
transformative copying;” the limiting language was “in a parody
case.”211
Cariou v. Prince took Bill Graham Archives’s characterization
of the Supreme Court’s holding one step further by quoting it as
authority without any indication of its derivation from Campbell
and its limited application to parody: the second “factor ‘may be
of limited usefulness where,’ as here, ‘the creative work of art
is being used for a transformative purpose.’”212
It also expanded to transformative use as a whole Campbell’s
recognition of the special need of parody to take more from the
original than would be justified in other fair uses.213 As Bill
Graham Archives did with the second factor, Cariou v. Prince
lifted a quote from Campbell that was specific to parody and
changed it to refer to transformative use: “[t]he secondary use
‘must be [permitted] to “conjure up” at least enough of the
original’ to fulfill its transformative purpose.”214 The actual quote
from Campbell is “[w]hen parody takes aim at a particular original
work, the parody must be able to “conjure up” at least enough of
that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable.”215
It is a big leap from a parody needing to use enough of the
“original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable”216 to
allowing any transformative use to conjure up as much as it needs
of an original work, especially one that is not likely or intended to
be recognized.217 It allows the defendant’s explanation for the
taking to justify the extent of it rather than putting the burden on
the defendant to argue a credible justification.
210

Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586) (emphasis added).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (emphasis added).
212
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618
(2013) (quoting Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612).
213
See id.
214
Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588) (emphasis added).
215
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
216
Id.
217
See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710.
211
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The appellate court in Cariou v. Prince held that the district
court erred in expanding to transformative use in general the
more specific requirement that parody comment on and ridicule
the original.218 After correcting that legal error, the appellate
court compounded a different legal error by expanding to
transformative use in general the special “privilege” of parody
to override the other fair use factors.219 What both courts
should have held is a more nuanced concept: not that
commenting on the original work defines what is
transformative, but that commenting on the original justifies—
and in most cases would be required to justify—a large-scale
taking of a prior work. Transformative uses other than parody
need to justify their taking at all as well as the extent of the
taking. Cariou v. Prince assumed away, rather than providing
such justification.220
This is not a specific fault of Cariou v. Prince because it
was already part of Second Circuit fair use jurisprudence, but it
is a fault that must be corrected to return transformativeness to
a more appropriate, modest role in analyzing one among many
factors rather than dominating the entire fair use analysis.
VII.

RETURNING TO A NEO-TRADITIONAL
BALANCING APPROACH
Judge Leval’s 1990 article noted that “[a] definite standard
would champion predictability at the expense of justification and
would stifle intellectual activity to the detriment of the copyright
objectives. We should not adopt a bright-line standard unless it
were a good one—and we do not have a good one.”221
As shown above, the Second Circuit has made
transformative use the primary test of fair use and has endowed
it with the power to override the other, potentially

218
219
220
221

Id. at 706.
Id.
See id.
Leval, supra note 1, at 1135.
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countervailing factors.222 It has not, however, proven to be
either a definite or bright-line standard, and its contribution to
predictability is no more than a correlation with an increase in
the likelihood of fair use being found.223 It has decayed into a
buzzword—a label rather than an explanation.
The problem is not confined to the Second Circuit, as shown
by the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Seltzer v. Green Day,
which involved the use of a street-art poster called “Scream
Icon” as a backdrop for a music video for the song “East Jesus
Nowhere” performed by Green Day.224 The fact that “the center
of the frame is dominated by an unchanging, but modified, Scream
Icon . . . . [t]hroughout the video” 225 would probably have been
enough to find infringement before the judicial tilt toward fair
use.226
While “[t]he plethora of cases addressing this topic means
there is no shortage of language from other courts elucidating (or
obfuscating) the meaning of transformation,”227 it did not deter the
Ninth Circuit from using it as the principal basis for concluding
that the music video constituted a fair use of the prior work:
Green Day used the original as “raw material” in
the construction of the four-minute video backdrop.
It is not simply a quotation or a republication;
although Scream Icon is prominent, it remains only
a component of what is essentially a street-art
focused music video about religion and especially
about Christianity (images of Jesus Christ appear—

222

See discussion supra Part VI.B.
See Beebe, supra note 136, at 604–06.
224
Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013).
225
See id.
226
See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 72–74, 83 (2d Cir.
1997), where a poster of Faith Ringgold’s artwork appeared fleetingly in the background
of a scene in a television sitcom. Its partial visibility, not in focus, in nine sequences
ranging from two to four seconds for a total of 27 seconds could not be determined as a
matter of law on summary judgment to be either de minimis or fair use.
227
Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1176.
223
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and are defaced—several times during the course of
the video).228
As in Cariou v. Prince and unlike Hart v. Electronic Arts,
the Ninth Circuit seems to have accepted that adding
surrounding material to an unaltered original work is
transformative, even if it is not used for a different purpose.229
The Scream Icon was considered transformative although it
retained its function as street art in “essentially a street-art
focused music video” and even though “the allegedly infringing
work ma[de] few physical changes to the original [and] fail[ed]
to comment on the original” because “new expressive content”
was added so that it was part of a music video “about religion
and especially about Christianity.”230
Judges seem oblivious to the flaws and to the low level of
esteem to which transformativeness has sunk among practitioners
and academics. To the extent that the judges clue into that, what
can the courts do to return the concept to a more modest and
appropriate role as simply one aspect of analyzing the first factor?
We should first look at how the law’s course might reasonably be
corrected, and then examine what that correction would look like.
A recent article by a leading copyright practitioner, Richard
Dannay, noted the large variety of alternatives to the four factors
that have been proposed over the years, including Professor
Melville Nimmer’s original suggestion that no factors be
mentioned at all.231 Nimmer recommended that the statute’s fair
228

Id. at 1176–77.
Id.
230
Id.
231
See Dannay, supra note 13, at 134–42. Dannay’s exhaustive summary was as
follows:
Apply fewer factors, namely, the first and forth; apply more factors,
including anything reasonably bearing on the issue of what’s “fair”
such as customary practices and broader social values; consult
readers’ responses; abandon fair use and injunctions in favor of
monetary damages for unauthorized derivative works; enhance the
second factor’s role and importance in the fair use analysis; apply the
fair use factors more flexibly and to the extent they respond to
recurring categories of cases such as parody and new technologies, to
enhance fair use predictability and uniformity; reserve fair use for
229
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use provision simply read that “the fair use of a copyrighted work,
as such phrase has heretofore been judicially defined and
recognized, is not an infringement of copyright.”232
A Congressional amendment to the Copyright Act is possible,
and there has been some movement toward a comprehensive look
at copyright law,233 but the distortion was introduced by case law
and does not rely on any statutory language. It would also likely
embroil a generally ineffective Congress in a complex task.
The preferable response to the first issue of how to correct the
over-reliance on transformativeness lies in the possibility of the
Supreme Court reversing course, as it did when first adopting the
transformative use test.234 The Court’s statement in the Sony case
that all commercial uses were presumptively unfair was clarified or
disowned (depending on your tolerance for euphemism) ten years
later in Campbell to make Copyright law safe for parody.235 The
Supreme Court has not addressed fair use other than in passing
references since then, so it has not expressed a view on whether the
situations in which true market failure has occurred; rely on nonbinding fair use arbitration, with a de novo court determination
available on liability but with some effect, up or down, on damages
depending on the outcome; institute an administrative procedure (a
Fair Use Board in the Copyright Office) to provide anticipatory,
nonprecedential adjudications offering immunity from suit; rely on
Supreme Court’s eBay four –factor test for a rigorous and consistent
evaluation of the propriety of injunctive relief in fair use cases;
develop “best practices” for categories of works such as
documentaries, poetry, and others, to introduce greater predictability
and reduce litigation risks.
Id. at 141–42 (citations omitted).
232
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, Part
5, 1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 316 (Comm. Print 1965); see
also Dannay, supra note 13 (Dannay’s thoughtful discussion of this idea is the subject of
the article cited).
233
Congressman Goodlatte, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, announced in
April 2013 that the Judiciary Committee will conduct a comprehensive review of U.S.
copyright law. Press Release, Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Judiciary Comm., Chairman
Goodlatte Announces Comprehensive Review of Copyright Law (Apr. 24, 2013),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/news/2013/04242013_2.html. It remains to be
seen, however, what, if anything, Congress is capable of doing.
234
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
235
See id. at 583–92.
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expansion of parody’s arguably unique position in fair use law
should extend to all transformative uses.
How might the fair use standard get to the Supreme Court
again? To the extent that other circuits back away from the
extreme use of transformativeness that has come to dominate
Second Circuit decisions, that could increase the likelihood of the
Supreme Court taking up the issue. After all, a split in the circuits
is considered the easiest path to a grant of certiorari. As noted
above, however, the Second Circuit’s view has received an uneven
acceptance in the Third Circuit in Hart v. Electronic Arts236 and in
the Ninth Circuit in Seltzer v. Green Day.237
Rejection of Second Circuit cases by a sister circuit might even
persuade the Second Circuit to reverse course, either explicitly or
sotto voce. The appellate court need not necessarily go en banc to
reverse course, nor would it even have to take the odd tactic
adopted when it reversed a mistaken view of trademark law in its
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc. decision.238 It could “limit”
Cariou v. Prince “to its facts” and note that it would be the rare
case where transformativeness alone could obliterate the statutory
fair use factors.239

236

Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165–69 (3d Cir. 2013).
Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176–78 (9th Cir. 2013).
238
In Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., the Second Circuit effectively reversed a prior
decision in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005), on
what constitutes “use in commerce.” It did so through the novel use of an Appendix to
the opinion that states that it was read and agreed to by the prior panel in 1-800 Contacts
as well as the unanimous panel in Rescuecom, but is “dictum and not a binding opinion of
the Court.” Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 124, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2009).
239
This is, to some extent, what it did with two decisions in rapid succession on de
minimis use in copyright. See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema, 147 F.3d 215, 216 (2d. Cir.
1998) (involving the use of ten photographic transparencies mounted on a light box in the
background of one scene from the film “Seven.” The longest uninterrupted view lasted
six seconds and the total time in which the photographs appeared, not in focus and in the
distant background, was thirty-five seconds. The court ruled that to be de minimis.). But
see, Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1997) (involving
the appearance in a television sitcom of a poster of Faith Ringgold’s artwork in the
background of a scene in a church social hall. Its partial visibility, not in focus, in nine
sequences, ranging from two to four seconds for a total of 27 seconds, was held not to be
de minimis.).
237
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As to the second issue, a return to a real application of the
statutory four-factor test would require, with respect to each of the
four factors, the following types of changes in legal analysis.
A. First Factor
Whether or not it was appropriate for the Supreme Court to
retreat from the proposition that commercial uses are
presumptively unfair, the plain language of the first factor demands
that the commercial nature of the secondary use at least matter and
count against a finding of fair use.240
There is little possibility of or justification for returning to a
bright-line rule based on distinguishing commercial from nonprofit
uses, and the line between them can be permeable anyway, but
Congress wanted the difference to matter and it makes sense that it
would. There is a difference worth noting, for example, between a
university using a work of art to teach a course and a company
selling t-shirts or posters of the artwork. There is also a significant
difference between a gallery promoting and selling a work and a
museum displaying it—even if the museum also sells posters or tshirts of it.
The idea is firmly ensconced in the law that judges should
weigh whether allowing the secondary use encourages the useful
arts more than calling it infringement. Campbell held that “[t]he
fair use doctrine . . . ‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’”241
Basing a decision on what is more likely to encourage or stifle
creativity is, however, a perilous proposition, if not a fool’s errand,
for at least the following reasons.
(a) That encouraging parody will not unjustifiably deprive an
author of his or her creative rewards is a relatively easy
proposition, especially because a parody will generally be of a
well-known work that has presumably already reaped rewards for
240

See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (citations omitted)
(second bracketed portion in original).
241
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its author. Taking it beyond parody to any transformative use
takes the court into trickier territory in having to decide whether
depriving the plaintiff of the right to control his work or to be
compensated for its use will stifle future authorship.
(b) That decision is all the more tricky since eBay eliminated
any presumption that a finding of infringement leads inevitably to
an injunction.242 The court no longer necessarily chooses between
allowing and forbidding the secondary user; the secondary user can
build on the original work by paying a royalty or other form of
compensation.243 This raises the price of the secondary use but
does not prohibit it or even inhibit it to anywhere near the extent
that an injunction and impoundment order would.
(c) Determining whether an adverse decision will deter a
defendant from future creativity is not just more difficult but also
requires the type of decision about what constitutes greater or
lesser creativity that judges claim to be loath to engage in. Being
held an infringer did not stop Jeff Koons from producing other
pieces of appropriation art,244 nor did it appear to hinder Richard
Prince in creating “Canal Zone.”245 Prince said that he could have
used stock images and, had he lost, presumably he would in the
future.246 Whether that would be a good or bad thing for art, or
whether the result would have been more or less creative than what
he actually did and was sued for is a question on which reasonable
art critics might disagree.
(d) The standard of copyrightability is originality.247 While
that may imply some minimal amount of creativity, judges have
242

See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006); Salinger v.
Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 80 (2d Cir. 2010).
243
See, e.g., Salinger, 607 F.3d at 80; Richard Dannay, Copyright Injunctions and Fair
Use: Enter eBay—Four-Factor Fatigue or Four-Factor Freedom?, 55 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y 449, 458–59 (2008).
244
See discussion supra Part B.2.
245
See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618
(2013).
246
See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 12, Cariou v. Prince, No. 11-1197 (2d Cir. Jan.
25, 2012) (citing testimony).
247
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of
authorship.”).
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long disclaimed any competence or authority to assess the degree
of creativity or artistic merit in any given work.248 The two
concepts are far from equivalent. Determining what type of art in
any given situation is more worthwhile and to be encouraged puts
judges exactly where they claim they do not want to be—in the
role of art critic rather than arbiter of legal rights.249
B. Second Factor
The second factor is the most easily and objectively
determined. Is the copied work published or unpublished, creative
or factual?250 Nevertheless, at least where published creative
works are at issue, it would be difficult to come up with any
example of a case where this factor has tipped the balance against
fair use.
The impotence of the second factor is readily apparent in the
appropriation art cases. That the appropriated work was creative
rather than factual should have weighed against fair use, but the
Second Circuit opinions have done little more than pay lip service
to that intuitive and statute based principle.
In Blanch v. Koons, the appellate court disagreed with the
district court’s conclusion that the photograph used was “‘banal
rather than creative,’” and noted that “‘the creative nature of
artistic images typically weighs in favor of the copyright holder,’
but nevertheless dismissed ‘the second factor [as having] limited
usefulness where the creative work of art is being used for a
transformative purpose.’”251 In Cariou v. Prince the defendant
248

See 1 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.01[B] (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (Holmes, J.)).
249
Judges consistently disclaim the role of art critic, but often nevertheless assume it.
See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013) (criticizing one view
of balancing right of publicity and freedom expression as “call[ing] upon judges to act as
both impartial jurists and discerning art critics. These two roles cannot co-exist.”). To
the extent that transformativeness is seen as a proxy for artistic merit one might question
whether judges have been or will be as reluctant to assert artistry as they claim they have
been.
250
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2) (2012).
251
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 257 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Bill Graham Archives v.
Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608, 612 (2d Cir. 2006)).
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attacked the creativeness of Cariou’s photographs in the district
court,252 but wisely abandoned that argument on appeal. The
Second Circuit noted that there was “no dispute that Cariou’s work
is creative and published” but, like Blanch v. Koons, dismissed the
importance of the second factor due to its conclusion about the
transformative use made of it.253 The second factor’s significance
in weighing against fair use in Rogers v. Koons cannot be assessed
because all the factors were said to disfavor fair use.254
The second factor should be rehabilitated to return to meaning
and significance in the fair use determination. Aside from parody
and satire, creative works should receive greater protection, and
the statutory tilting toward greater protection for creative works
should not be so easily dismissed with the statement that it is “of
limited usefulness where the creative work of art is being used for
a transformative purpose.”255 The transformative purpose of the
secondary use may outweigh the creativity of the original work
where little of the original work is used (third factor) or it is a
small part of the secondary work (which is part of the
transformativeness determination), but the appropriation of a
creative work should not be so lightly dismissed.
C. Third Factor
Taken alone, the third factor focuses solely on “the proportion
of the original work used, and not how much of the secondary
work comprises the original.”256 Balanced against the first factor,
however, “how much of the secondary work comprises the
original,” and, more importantly, the justification for it, can cancel
out any significance of the third factor.257 This, as shown above, is
252

The district court rejected Prince’s contention “that Cariou’s Photos are mere
compilations of facts concerning Rastafarians and the Jamaican landscape, arranged with
minimum creativity in a manner typical of their genre, and that the Photos are therefore
not protectable as a matter of law . . . .” Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 346
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
253
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618
(2013).
254
See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309–312 (2d Cir. 1992).
255
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 257 (citing Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612).
256
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710.
257
Id. at 706–07.
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primarily due to the importation of parody standards into
transformativeness.258
Parody does indeed need to conjure up a significant amount of
its object to achieve its parodic purpose.259 Transformative use
other than parody does not necessarily need to do that. Where a
parody is not at issue, there should generally be an inverse
relationship between “the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole” and the degree
of transformation in the accused work.260
The Second Circuit has recognized this, albeit in the language
of transformativeness, in holding that the third factor “recognizes
that fragmentary copying is more likely to have a transformative
purpose than wholesale copying.”261 The decision in Cariou v.
Prince can, to some extent, be interpreted primarily through the
third factor.262 Many of the works held to be fair use used very
little of Cariou’s photographs, but many of them also contained
significant and fairly intact images from the photographs.263 An
appropriately calibrated transformative use test would reinforce the
significance of the third factor and make it more predictable
because the proportion of the original work used is reasonably
susceptible to objective determination.
D. Fourth Factor
The statute requires the court to consider “the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”264
That is the language of degree and a continuum: Is there likely to
be an effect and, if so, how bad? It has been distorted from a
continuum to a high threshold by holding that the issue is not
whether the secondary use affects the potential market for the
copyrighted work—or even whether it destroys it—but whether it
258
259
260
261
262
263
264

See id. at 710.
See id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994)).
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012).
On Davis v. The Gap, 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001).
See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710.
Id. at 710–11.
17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
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“usurps” it.265 Again, that is a matter of expanding Campbell’s
limited holding about parody that it cannot, by definition, usurp the
market for the original because there is no secondary market for
ridicule. The special status of parody in being allowed not just to
affect but also to destroy the value of the original should not
govern all fair use or even all transformative use.
Moreover, the assumption that no one would be willing to
license ridicule266 needs to be challenged. Whether that is true
should be a factual determination in the individual case rather than
assumed, even in parody cases, but especially if it is
transformativeness in general that is being assessed. That not
everyone is so lacking in a sense of humor or so averse to a
potential licensing fee is belied by instances where artists do give
permission for parody. After all, Weird Al Yankovic does
parodies only by permission of the artist mocked.267
What has also gotten lost in the recent cases is the principle
from Sony reiterated in Harper & Row that it is not just the harm of
the potential use directly in front of the court that matters, but,
more importantly, the harm if that specific practice were to become
common. “[T]o negate fair use one need only show that if the
265

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (“This distinction
between potentially remediable displacement and unremediable disparagement is
reflected in the rule that there is no protectible derivative market for criticism.”).
266
See, e.g., id. (“[T]he unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license
critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the very
notion of a potential licensing market.”).
267
See FAQ, “Weird Al” Yankovic (2013), http://www.weirdal.com/faq.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2014). Weird Al Yankovic’s website has the following “FAQs”:
Does Al get permission to do his parodies?
Al does get permission from the original writers of the songs that he
parodies. While the law supports his ability to parody without
permission, he feels it’s important to maintain the relationships that
he’s built with artists and writers over the years. Plus, Al wants to
make sure that he gets his songwriter credit (as writer of new lyrics)
as well as his rightful share of the royalties.
What do the original artists think of the parodies?
Most artists are genuinely flattered and consider it an honor to have
Weird Al parody their work. Some groups (including Nirvana) claim
that they didn’t realize that they had really “made it” until Weird Al
did a parody of them!
Id.
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challenged use ‘should become widespread, it would adversely
affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.’”268 Cariou
v. Prince failed to deal with this variant of the elementary school
teacher’s question—“what if everyone did it?”—in analyzing the
fourth factor; it did not take into account the damage to
photographers not just from Prince’s specific use of Cariou’s
photographs, but the harm if that practice within appropriation art
and other similar types of art became prevalent.269 It may be that
appropriation art should still win in those instances, but the choice
and the factors involved in that choice need to be squarely faced.
The other problem with the fourth factor is one of avoiding two
competing circular arguments—one favoring and one disfavoring a
fair use determination. The pro-defendant circularity is noted by
Professor Netanel, who pointed out that transformativeness
“effectively delimits the legally relevant market” by defining it
away: “If a use is unequivocally transformative, then, by
definition, it causes no market harm since the copyright holder
does not have a right to exclude others from the market for
transformative uses.”270
The pro-plaintiff circularity is discussed in the Nimmer
treatise.271 It points out that if the potential market considered
under the fourth factor is defined by nothing more than the manner
in which the secondary artist used the copyrighted work, then, by
that definition, a potential licensing opportunity has been lost.272
“[I]t is a given in every fair use case that plaintiff suffers a loss of a
potential market if that potential market is defined as the
theoretical market for licensing the very use at bar.”273 The
Second Circuit has tried to avoid this circularity by “limiting the
universe of potential effect on [cognizable] licensing revenues . . .

268

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (quoting
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
269
See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708–09 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
618 (2013).
270
Netanel, supra note 149, at 744.
271
See NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13.05[A][1][d][4].
272
See id.
273
Id.
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to ‘traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets.’”274
There is, of course, always room for debate over what is traditional
or reasonable.275
Another way in which the transformativeness analysis has
unfairly redefined the fourth factor is shown in the Second
Circuit’s analysis of Prince’s effect on Cariou’s market or the
value of his photographs.276 The court’s description of the
difference in a manner that seems fascinated by the astronomical
prices of Prince’s artwork and the glitz of his potential customers
defines the market by social demographic more than by similarity
of the goods.277 It could also, in another context, have provided
the rationale for dismissing “Canal Zone” as shamelessly
commercial.278
VIII.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEO-TRADITIONAL APPROACH,
WITH ONE MODERN TWIST
Quantitative academic studies have shown a correlation
between the increasing dominance of the transformative use
analysis and increasing decisions in favor of fair use.279 They have
been cautious about reaching any conclusions about a causal
connection,280 but the evolution of appropriation art cases, though
not necessarily one-directional, strongly suggests that there is. The
doctrinal shift is not necessarily causing the shift in outcomes, or
vice-versa. They may also be just enabling each other.
274
Id. (quoting American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir.
1994)).
275
See id.
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See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708–09 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
618 (2013).
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See id.
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Id. at 709 (“Certain of the Canal Zone artworks have sold for two million or more
dollars. The invitation list for a dinner that Gagosian hosted in conjunction with the opening
of the Canal Zone show included a number of the wealthy and famous such as the musicians
Jay-Z and Beyonce Knowles, artists Damien Hirst and Jeff Koons, professional football player
Tom Brady, model Gisele Bundchen, Vanity Fair editor Graydon Carter, Vogue editor Anna
Wintour, authors Jonathan Franzen and Candace Bushnell, and actors Robert DeNiro,
Angelina Jolie, and Brad Pitt.”).
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See Netanel, supra note 149, at 740.
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See id. at 740–42; see also Beebe, supra note 136, at 597, 604–06.
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While there are many potential explanations other than the
ascendancy of transformativeness to explain the difference in
results from the first to the second Koons cases—including the
very different quantity and quality of the original photograph
taken—it is difficult to imagine the fairly radical shift from the
first Koons case to Cariou v. Prince without not just the
transformative analysis, but, just as importantly, its ability to beat
all other factors into submission.
That they correlate means that a return to balancing the
traditional factors is likely to lead to or correlate with a reduction
in outcomes favoring fair use, but there is one modern doctrinal
innovation that could go a long way toward mitigating the effect of
reducing fair use determinations. It is lurking in Cariou v. Prince
and may explain what the appellate court was, sotto voce, trying to
do when it pointed out that under the Supreme Court’s eBay
decision, as further elaborated in Salinger v. Colting,281 the district
court would have to reconsider whether an injunction was
appropriate if it concluded that any of the five remanded works of
art infringed.282
By not declaring all the works of “Canal Zone” fair use and
remanding five of them rather than holding them to be
infringements as a matter of law, and in reminding the district
court that an injunction would not necessarily follow a finding of
infringement, the Court of Appeals was probably suggesting that
the parties settle the remaining issue with a payment to Cariou—
281

See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–94 (2006) (relying on an
analogy to copyright law, the Court held that there is no presumption of irreparable harm
in patent cases and therefore no general rule that an injunction will follow from an
adjudication of infringement). Recognizing that prior case law presumptions that “a
plaintiff likely to prevail on the merits of a copyright claim is also likely to suffer
irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue” had been abrogated by eBay, Salinger v.
Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010), held that eBay dictated that a “court must not adopt a
‘categorical’ or ‘general’ rule or presume that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
harm . . . . Instead, the court must actually consider the injury the plaintiff will suffer if
he or she loses on the preliminary injunction but ultimately prevails on the merits, paying
particular attention to whether the ‘remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury.’” Id. at 80 (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–
94).
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See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712 n.5.
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not necessarily a large payment but something approaching what a
reasonable royalty would have been if negotiated in the first place.
The case did indeed settle before the district court made further
substantive rulings. The terms of the agreement were not, of
course, revealed, other than that Prince and the galleries are free
and clear of any claim by Cariou.
And that may well be where fair use law should be going.
Plaintiffs are not going to regain the favored status they had when
the first Koons decision came down, which included not just a
judgment against Koons but an order requiring him to deliver his
remaining work to be impounded and potentially destroyed, but the
law will also not be as pro-defendant as Cariou v. Prince would
indicate. Counterbalancing a more pro-plaintiff view of fair use
that would come from closer congruence with the statute and its
multi-factor balancing test will be a reluctance to grant injunctions
and therefore greater focus on damages and royalty calculations.
Like Cariou v. Prince, this direction may not make either side
happy, but it will at least bring some of the conceptual clarity that
fair use law has lost.

